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In his famous book, ”The End of History and the Last Man”, published in 1992, 
Francis Fukuyama argued that Western democracy represents the end point of the 
socio-cultural evolution of humanity and the final form of government.1  
 
While Fukuyama’s forecast proved to be wrong, one wonders whether his prediction 
could be more accurate for the evolution of the structure of the universe of 
international investment agreements (IIAs). Has the existing composition of the IIA 
regime, characterized by thousands of bilateral, regional, sectoral, and plurilateral 
treaties—supplemented by numerous non-binding investment principles and 
guidelines—reached its final form, notwithstanding the on-going discussions about 
the substantive content of IIAs? In other words, is the idea of a multilateral 
investment agreement that crowns all previous IIA rulemaking a dream that will never 
come true?  
 
Over many decades, all attempts to establish a multilateral investment treaty have 
failed. In addition, the IIA regime has lost part of its dynamism. Fewer new treaties 
are being signed, signaling that the IIA networks of many countries are becoming 
saturated. There is also a small, but growing, number of countries that have 
terminated existing IIAs or denounced their membership in the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).2  
 
What, then, could still push the move toward a multilateral investment regime? A 
look at history shows that milestones in multilateralism may result from extraordinary 
catalytic events – such as the end of the Second World War, which paved the way for 
the foundation of the United Nations and the Breton Woods institutions, or the 
termination of the East-West confrontation in the late 1980s that created an 
atmosphere conducive to the establishment of the World Trade Organization and the 
Energy Charter Treaty. In “normal” times, the basic question is whether countries feel 
comfortable with on-going, limited “repair work” within the existing structure of the 
IIA regime—such as giving more weight to the social and environmental aspects of 
investment, clarifying and delimiting the content of individual treaty provisions, fine-
tuning dispute settlement provisions, adopting principles on corporate social 
 2
responsibility—or whether they think that more fundamental changes to the structure 
of the IIA regime are needed to make investment work better for sustainable 
development and inclusive growth.3  
 
Much of the criticism of the current IIA regime can be addressed within its existing 
structure. This is the case, for instance, with regard to concerns about an undue 
reduction of national governments’ policy space as a result of IIAs, the substantial 
increase in investor-state disputes, or demands to strengthen the sustainable 
development dimension of IIAs.4 To the extent that one aims at further investment 
liberalization, it can be achieved more easily between a limited number of countries at 
the bilateral or regional level. More generally, the prospects for a multilateral 
investment treaty decrease when more countries aim for an ambitious treaty dealing 
with all policy facets of FDI. 
 
Thus, the value added by a new multilateral undertaking would not lie primarily in its 
substantive content, but in other aspects, such as strengthening the bargaining position 
of developing countries, efficiency gains through multilateral treaty coverage, the 
achievement of greater policy coherence, and the possible avoidance of investment 
distortions.  
 
For many years now, these considerations have not been strong enough to trigger a 
move toward a multilateral investment treaty. The recent trend toward more regional 
investment treaties may further reduce the impetus to move toward multilateralism. 
On the other hand, if regional treaties were to have similar content and broad 
coverage, they would de facto come close to a multilateral approach. In any case, it 
seems that the existing spaghetti bowl of IIAs, with all its complexity, will continue to 
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